Alaska Statutes

AS 22.05.010 Jurisdiction.

(a) The supreme court has the final appellate jurisdiction in all

actions and proceedings. However, a party has only one appeal

as a matter of right from an action or proceeding commenced in

either the district court or the superior court.

 

 

 

 

 

 

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

 

This is an appeal from the following judgment and order entered by the Honorable Niesje J. Steinkruger of the Alaska Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District:

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (treated as Motion for Summary Judgment), filed January 22, 1997;

Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Request for Trial by Jury, filed December 3, 1996.

A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on February 24, 1997.

The jurisdiction of the Alaska Supreme Court in this appeal is founded upon Article IV, Section 1, of the Alaska Constitution, AS 22.05.010, and Rule 202 of the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure.

 

 

 

 

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List of all parties to the case:

Wolfgang Falke, Olive Anderson, Rudy Voigt, Don Carpenter, Sidney Childers, Virginia F Kittredge, Ronald A. Jeager, Sandra J. Copeland, Jefferson J. Blevans, Randall B. Wallace, Martha M. Smelcer and Danny B. Stepp Jr., individually and on behalf of all other Plaintiffs, vs. The Council of the City of Fairbanks, Alaska, in particular Mayor James C. Hayes, Councilmen Billie Ray Allen, Jerry Cleworth, John Immel, Romar Swarner, Jim Whitaker, and Bob Wolting, Defendants.

 

 

 

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

 

  1. Was it error for the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs (appellant herein)

have no right to a jury trial and was it error for the trial court to deny the plaintiffs’

request for a trial by a jury and did the trial court exceed its jurisdiction when it

attempted to determine the matters of facts without a jury?

 

  1. Was it error for the trial court to grant the defendants’ (appellees herein)

motion for judgment on the pleadings and to treat said motion as a motion for

summary judgment because there remained genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiffs (appellant herein) properly requested a trial by jury as a matter of

fundamental right and they did not waive said right and that therefore the trial

court lacked jurisdiction as a trier of facts?