A R G U M E N T

    1. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

    1. The City Council, in their Brief of the Appellees page 2 are mistaken in their assertion that the appellants seek "only equitable relief"; that assertion is not supported by the evidence. Appellants seek legal relief based on the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18. [Exc. 1-4 and 14 - 16]. Nowhere in the Complaint or the First Amended Complaint or elsewhere in the trial court proceeding did the plaintiffs seek relief based on legislative enactments. Thus, no relief is sought on any equitable grounds, only on legal grounds having its foundation in the Constitution of the State of Alaska.
    2. As a matter of law, the genuine issue of material fact whether

the taking of the proceeds from the sale for a different public purpose, namely a "permanent fund", without justly compensating the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated for their interests in the assets of FMUS, is for a jury to decide in this matter, and neither the trial court nor this Court "de novo" has the legal authority to decide in this action the genuine issues of material fact.

    1. Seeking injunctive relief is a remedy. It does not provide for relief of an equitable claim nor a legal claim. Granting or denying injunctive relief is always an action in equity at the discretion of the court, because the law does not provide relief. However, should it be necessary for the court to determine issues of genuine material fact to grant or deny a motion or an action seeking injunctive relief where the claim is a legal one and a jury trial is properly demanded and not waived, the court has no legal authority to act as the trier of facts

    1. Courts have long held that municipal property, such as the assets of FMUS, "is exempt from being taken or applied to any other public use" such as the establishment of a permanent fund, "without compensation being made" to those that "may properly be said to have an interest" in assets such as of FMUS. Coley v. Gray, 30 A. 728, 733 (Del. 1884). The appellants do not claim "that the sale of FMUS by the City was an unconstitutional ‘taking’ of private property for public use" as the City Council assert in the Summary of Argument in their Brief of the Appellees pages 2, 3, that frivolous assertion of the City Council is made without citing any evidence or authority. Thus the City Council claims without merit that "[t]he City’s sale of FMUS does not involve a taking of private property." The appellants claim that the taking of the proceeds of the FMUS sale for another use, namely a purported permanent fund, without compensation to the appellants or plaintiffs and all others similarly situated, violates the fundamental law, namely the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18. Coley, supra. (Exc. 48,

49, paragraphs 10, 12, 13). These are claims that have merit. "The word ’merit’ as a legal term is to be regarded as referring to the strict legal rights of the parties." Mink v. Keim, 41 N.Y.S.2d 769,771 (N.Y. 1943); Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, West Publ., 1971, page 892, under Merits.