The determining factor in whether a fact must be tried by a jury as a matter of fundamental right is not whether the relief sought is injunctive and equitable as such, but whether the claim asserted was a legal claim and not an equitable claim. "At common law, the existence of a right to trial by jury depended upon whether the claim asserted was legal or equitable in nature. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 733 (1970). State v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 423 (Alaska 1982). The claims asserted in the Complaint [Exc. 1-3] and the First Amended Complaint [Exc. 14 -16] are all fundamental and legal claims. There are no equitable claims set forth in either of said complaints. The Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 16, guarantees a trial by a jury of all facts regarding the legal claims asserted in said complaints. Thus, no court, whether or not considering injunctive relief, has the legal authority to determine the material facts of the legal claims asserted in the complaint, only a jury, as was properly demanded in this matter [Exc. 7], can. Therefore, the City Council is mistaken in their assertion that the appellants have no right to a jury trial because the injunctive relief they seek is purportedly only equitable in nature.

"It is well settled that an injunction is an equitable remedy available generally in the protection or to prevent an invasion of a legal right." Meridian, Limited, v. City and County of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 548, (CA .1939). The appellants filed for injunctive relief to protect their legal right for just compensation for their interest in the assets of FMUS pursuant to the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18. (Exc. 2, 3 and 15, 16) There is no law that provides for such protection, namely to preserve said right until the ordinances are properly amended and comply with the fundamental law enumerated above.

"An injunction is an extraordinary remedy which is

available if there is no adequate remedy at law.

Perkins v. Quaker City (1956), 165 Ohio St. 120,

59 O.O. 151 133 N.E.2d 595, syllabus; Garono v. State

(1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 524 N.E.2d 496, 498-499.

Its purpose is to prevent a future wrong that the law cannot.

Sternberg v. Kent State Univ. Bd. of Trustees (1974),

37 Ohio St.2d 115, 118, 66 O.O.2d 257, 258-259,

308 N.E.2d 457, 460." Abraham v. Wood Cty. Sewer Dist.,

669 N.E.2d 514, 518 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. 1995).

The future wrong in this case is that the financial and other interests the appellants and all others similarly situated have in the FMUS are going to be used for a different public purpose without just compensation and that is in violation of the fundamental right set forth in the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18.

Thus, the remedy of injunctive relief sought in this action is not for the purpose to stop the sale of FMUS unconditionally but an implied request for a specific performance, namely to bring the ordinances and terms of the sale of FMUS in compliance with the law, namely the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18, and to provide for just compensation for those that claim to have an interest in the assets of FMUS, namely the appellants or the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. The complaints clearly seek only conditional injunctive relief, namely to stop the defendants from proceeding with the sale of FMUS "under the present ordinances and terms." [Exc. 3 and 16]. The complaints do not ask for a mandamus or specific order for the City Council to bring their ordinances in compliance with the fundamental law; the purpose of the complaints was to give the City Council a choice, namely either to bring the ordinances and sales terms into compliance with the constitutional mandates or to stop the sales proceedings.

The claims made in said complaints and the injunctive relief sought therein are the proper action for said purpose.

An injunction is generally a preventive and protective

remedy, aimed at future acts; it is not intended to

redress past wrongs. Board of County Commissioners

of Pitking County v. Pfeifer, 190 Colo. 275,546 P.2d 946

(1976); Wyman v. Jones, 123 Colo. 234, 228 P.2d 158

(1951); 42 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions ss 4 (1969). A decree

of specific performance remedies a past breach of contract

by fulfilling the legitimate expectations of the wronged

promisee. Thurman v. Skipton, 157 Colo. 423, 403 P.2d

211 (1965); (further citation omitted) Snyder v. Sullivan,

705 P.2d 510, 513 (Colo. 1985).

Of course this instant case is not an action at equity. The contract involved in this instant case is a social contract (see Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed., page 1246 under Social contract, or compact: "Government must therefore rest on the consent of the governed.") with the terms of the social contract vested in the fundamental law, that is the Constitution of the State of Alaska, Article I, Section 18. There are no equitable claims made in the complaints in this matter, only legal claims. And as a matter of law, the timely demand was made that all issues of material fact be tried by a jury, and a trial by a jury was not waived [Exc. 7].

Therefore, the City Council is mistaken in their assertion on pages 2 and 4 in their Brief of the Appellees that the appellants purportedly seek "only equitable relief"; appellants seek not only injunctive relief but an implied decree of specific performance, namely an implied mandate to bring the respective ordinances and terms of the FMUS sale in compliance with the legal claim and to provide for just compensation pursuant to the Alaska Constitution, Article I Section 18. Further, any claim of violation of a legal right or action for protection of a legal right such

as set forth in the Alaska Constitution, Article I, Section 18, is an action at law in which the facts must be tried by a jury if such is timely demanded and not waived

[Exc. 7], and it was therefore error for the trial court to deny the properly demanded Request for a Trial by Jury [Exc. 9].